# Redistricting in Georgia: A 20-Year History 

## Town Hall - June 21, 2021



PRINCETON
GERRYMANDERING PROJECT

Fixing bugs in democracy


## We Are Asking For Three Big Changes

1. Listen

- Draw maps using community input
- Communities provide clear definitions
- Legislature responds to each defined community

2. Show your work

- More public and transparent process

- April 19 letter to Duncan, Ralston, committees signed by 20 organizations
- Requests waiver of secrecy
- Fifteen specific changes for public access

3. Check your work

- Commit to meeting independent, non-partisan benchmarks for districts


Hannah Wheelen


PRINCETON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT

Fixing bugs in democracy


Sara Hodges


## Decennial Redistricting Process in Georgia



## Public Participation Is Discouraged

- Public meetings are often scheduled at the last minute
- District maps often aren't released before public meetings
- Bills consist of a listing of census tracts or other incomprehensible unit
- Legislator communications with LCRO are legally privileged and confidential
 Qiseburagefds or Open Meetings Act

Federal District population must be APPROXIMATELY EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS ACT must be followed

Georgia Districts must be CONTIGUOUS

General Assembly 2011 non-binding guidelines considered: COMPACTNESS

COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST
EXISTING POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
AVOID PAIRING INCUMBENTS COMMITTEES MAY CONSIDER OTHER FACTORS

## Legislators Draw Their Own Maps

Legislators control the process

Each chamber draws its own maps

Chambers have "Gentlemen's Agreement" to approve each other's map

Politicians choose their own constituents with little oversight and vague rules


## Mid-decade Redistricting Protects Incumbents

The Georgia General Assembly can redraw districts at every session; very few other states allow mid-decade redistricting without a court order

Mid-decade redistricting (2000-2021):

- 15 bills brought to the floor; 6 passed
- 97 proposed alterations; 64 districts changed
"...objective was to make these districts ... better for these incumbents to get reelected."
- Deposition of Gina Wright,

Executive Director of LCRO

## Gerrymandered Maps Can Be Difficult To Detect

Historically, gerrymandered maps had extremely contrived boundaries


State Senate District 16, 2002
Now gerrymandered districts are hard to detect by looking at a map; detection today requires a more technical set of analysis tools

## Fair Districts GA / Princeton Gerrymandering Project Partnership

Purpose: Provide independent, non-partisan benchmarks / fairness tests
Phase 1: complete
20-year history

- Last 2 redistricting cycles
- Mid-cycle redistricting


## Phase 2: begins August/September

Based on 2020 census

- Benchmarks / fairness tests
- Evaluation of proposed maps

|  | Partisan <br> balance | Minority <br> representation |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| State <br> House | $?$ | $?$ |
| State <br> Senate | $?$ | $?$ |
| Congress | $?$ | $?$ |

## Key Questions For 20-year History Analysis

Partisan fairness

- How well does the legislature represent voters' preferences?
- Do maps reflect voters' preferences?
- Do maps reflect their communities?
- Would maps drawn without partisan influence better reflect voters' preferences and communities?

Minority representation

- Do maps provide adequate minority representation?


## Twenty Years of Decennial and Mid-decade Redistricting

decennial redistricting by Dems
districts found
unconstitutional, mid-decade $\left.\begin{array}{c}\text { decennial } \\ \text { redrawn by }\end{array}\right)$ adjustments redistricting the court

by GOP

by GOP by

mid-decade adjustments by GOP

mid-decade adjustments by GOP

- 2 decennial redistricting cycles
- 1 court-ordered adjustment of maps
- 6 successful mid-decade adjustments (64 districts changed)
- 9 failed mid-decade adiustmentc (3) attemnted


## Partisan Analysis 2000-2020

Analyzed General Assembly and statewide election results for 20 years

- every district map change
- statewide election results

Representation should respond to changes in votsing patterns
fewer votes $\downarrow=$ fewer seats $\downarrow$

State House Detailed Look at Partisan Gerrymandering


## State House After Decennial Redistricting by Democrats



Democratic decennial redistricting

Principle:
More votes =
More seats

Fewer votes =
Fewer seats

2002: GOP won majority of statewide vote, but didn't gain any seats.

## State House After Court Redrew District Map



Principle:
More votes =
More seats

Fewer votes =
Fewer seats

2004: GOP won majority of seats as court-drawn maps restore the balance.

## State House After Mid-Decade Redistricting by GOP



Principle:
More votes =
More seats

Fewer votes =
Fewer seats

2006: GOP gained 10 seats with same vote share.

## State House After Decennial Redistricting by GOP



## State House: Gerrymandering Sustains Partisan Advantage



## The 2011/12 State House Map Cracked Small Cities

The number of small cities cracked into multiple districts increased by 44\% in the 2011 decennial House redistricting

Two-thirds of small cities are cracked into multiple House districts

cities cracked
before 2011
cities cracked in 2011
redistricting

Newnan Cracked into 3 House Districts

```
2010-before redistricting
```

2011—after redistricting


Newnan pop $(2019)=41,500$
Average district $(2021)=$

Lawrenceville Cracked into 6 House Districts
2010-before redistricting
2010-before redistricting

```
2011-after redistricting
```




Lawrenceville pop $(2019)=$ 30,800

## State Senate - Gerrymandering Sustains Partisan Advantage



## Are the maps fair?



## State Senate: Fairness Benchmarks Using Randomly Drawn Maps

Princeton Gerrymandering Project simulation

- Create 500,000 Senate maps at random based on 2010 census
- Comply with laws and traditional redistricting criteria
- Maintain current number of VRA-compliant districts



## State Senate: Minority Representation

For each of 500,000 simulated maps...
...calculate percent Black Voting Age Population (2010) for each of 56 districts.

Percent Black Voting Age
Population (2010) per district


## State Senate: Simulated Maps Expected Results



BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS (>= 50\%)


Range of Black Voting Age Population of 500,000 simulated maps


Each dot is a district with the 2010 Black Voting Age Population we would expect to see

```
Source: PGP
simulation using
2010 census
```


## State Senate: Enacted Map Results

BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS (>= 50\%)


Range of Black Voting Age Population of 500,000 simulated maps
outliers


Each dot is one district's actual 2010

Black Voting Age Population

```
Source: PGP
simulation using
2010 census
```


## State Senate: 13 Extreme Districts

## 100\%

BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS (>= 50\%)


5 extreme districts show fewer Black voters than expected

Range of Black Voting Age Population of 500,000 simulated maps
outliers


Each dot is one district's actual 2010

Black Voting Age Population

Source: PGP simulation using 2010 census

## State Senate: No Opportunity Districts



## State Senate: Minority Packing and Cracking



## State Senate: Minority Packing and Cracking



State Senate Districts, sorted least to most Percent Black Voting-Age Population

## State Senate: Fairness Benchmarks - Partisan Representation

For each of 500,000 simulated maps...
...estimate State Senate election results from 2016 presidential vote by precinct.

Simulated state
Senate results


Least Democratic $\longrightarrow>$ Most Democratic

## State Senate: Fairness Benchmarks - Partisan Representation



## State Senate: Simulated Maps Expected Results



## State Senate: Enacted Map Results



## State Senate: Enacted Map Results



State Senate Districts, sorted least to most Democratic

## State Senate: Fewer Democratic and Competitive Seats




## Gerrymandering Contributes to Political Polarization

## Uncompetitive elections mean unresponsive politicians

Opposition candidates don't run
Elections are decided in the primary
People don't turn out to vote
Worst case-scenario: uncontested elections
Uncontested elections limit voter choice
$50 \%$ of state Senate elections were uncontested (28)
52\% of state House elections were uncontested (94)

- National average is $35 \%$


## Uncontested Elections Reduce Voter Turnout

Voter turnout, 2020 Presidential election

Average voter turnout for President was 7.4
percentage-points lower in uncontested House districts



## Summary of Phase 1 Findings

|  | Benchmarks / Fairness tests (compared to unbiased maps) |  |  | Observations |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Partisan balance | Competitive districts | Minority representation |  |
| State House | X <br> 1-7 fewer Dem districts than $83 \%$ of unbiased maps | 23 competitive districts, more than $81 \%$ of unbiased maps | - 47 Black majority districts (as expected) <br> - 8 opportunity districts (more than expected) | Decennial gerrymandering <br> - Dems - 2001 <br> - Reps - 2011 <br> Extensive mid-decade redistricting 2/3 of small cities split <br> Black voter packing and cracking |
| State Senate | X <br> 1-6 fewer Dem districts than $98 \%$ of unbiased maps | 1-9 fewer competitive districts than 91\% of unbiased maps | - 15 Black majority districts (as expected) <br> - Missing 1-3 opportunity districts compared to $98 \%$ of unbiased maps | Decennial gerrymandering <br> - Dems - 2001 <br> - Reps - 2011 <br> Extensive mid-decade redistricting Black voter packing and cracking eliminates opportunity districts |
| Congress | Balanced as of 2016-2020 | 2 competitive districts, $78 \%$ have 1-2 | - 4 Black majority districts (as expected) <br> - Slight chance to create 1 opportunity district | Mid-decade redistricting <br> Demographic shift has increased competitiveness of 2011 map |

## FDGA / PGP Producing Benchmarks for 2021 Maps

|  | Benchmarks / Fairness tests <br> (range of values based on final 2020 census data) |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
|  | Partisan balance | Competitive districts | Minority representation |
| State House | Republicans: W-X districts <br> Democrats: Y-Z districts | X-Y competitive districts | W-X Majority-minority districts <br> Y-Z opportunity districts |
| State Senate | Republicans: W-X districts <br> Democrats: Y-Z districts | X-Y competitive districts | W-X Majority-minority districts <br> Y-Z opportunity districts |
| Congress | Republicans: W-X districts <br> Democrats: Y-Z districts | X-Y competitive districts | W-X Majority-minority districts <br> Y-Z opportunity districts |

Benchmarks pending release of full 2020 census data

- Use August 16th release if possible
- Full redistricting data released Sept. 30

Evaluation of maps pending release by legislature

## The Benefits of Independent Benchmarks

- Transparency - check by independent experts
- Restores public trust and confidence in the process
- Demonstrates compliance with Voting Rights Act
- May help avoid litigation
- Fairer districts


## It's Your Turn to Speak!

Public hearings - watch \& testify

- June 15 - kickoff - replay on General Assembly website
- June 28 - Atlanta - Georgia State Capitol, Room 341
- June 29 - Cumming - South Forsyth High School
- June 30 - Dalton - Dalton State College
- July 6 - Athens
- July 7 - Augusta
- July 26 - Brunswick
- July 27 - Albany
- July 28 - Columbus
- July 29 - Macon
- July 30 - Virtual


## *tell

 your storyCommunity input must shape redistricting in Georgia. Learn how to tell your story at redistricting public input meetings!

Tuesday, J une 22nd
5 pm to 7 pm
Register @
bit.Iy/TellYourStory0622
This is a nonpartisan event

ADVANCING
ADVANC
JUSTICE
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## Questions?



Princeton
Gerrymandering Project


# Redistricting in Georgia: A 20-Year History Appendix 

## State House: Fewer Democratic districts, but competitive

Current enacted 50,000
map-79 simulated maps


## State House: Minority Opportunity Districts



## Congress: Fair to both parties, reasonably competitive

Democratic districts: 99\% of simulated maps have $5-6$, enacted map in range

500,000 Current enacted
simulated maps map-6


Competitive districts: 78\% of simulated maps have

1-2 competitive seats

map - 2 simulated maps

Estimated competitive districts applying an average of three elections (2016-2020)

## Congress: Simulated Maps Expected Results



500,000
Simulated maps
Range of Black
Voting Age
Population


Each dot is a district with the 2010 Black Voting Age Population we would expect to see

## Congress: Enacted Map Results



## Congress: Opportunity Districts



## Congress: 1 Extreme District



## State House: Fairness Benchmarks

The Princeton Gerrymandering Project used a computer to create 50,000 House maps at random that are based on the 2010 census and comply with redistricting laws as well as the current map does


## State House: Minority Representation

For each one of 50,000 simulated maps

Calculate percent Black Voting Age Population (2010) for each of 180 districts

Percent Black Voting Age
Population (2010) per district


## State House: Simulated Maps Expected Results



## State House : Enacted Map Results



## State House: 50 Extreme Districts



## State House: Fairness Benchmarks-Partisan Representation

For each simulated map, we estimate state House election results based on 2016 presidential vote by precinct

For each map


Simulated state
House results


## State House: Fairness Benchmarks-Partisan Representation



## Congress: Partisan Balance



## Congress: Competitive Seats



## State House: Simulated Maps Expected Results




Each dot is a district with the percentage of Democratic voters we would expect to see

## State House: Enacted Map Results



## State House: 57 Extreme Districts


$0 \%$

State House: Partisan Balance


## State House: Competitive Seats



## Congress: fairness benchmarks

The Princeton Gerrymandering Project used a computer to create 500,000
Congressional maps at random that are based on the 2010 census and comply with redistricting laws as well as the current map does


## Congress: Minority Representation

For each one of 500,000 simulated maps

Calculate percent Black Voting Age Population (2010) for each of 14 districts

Percent Black Voting Age Population (2010) per district


## Congress: Fairness Benchmarks-Partisan Representation

For each simulated map, we estimate Congressional election results based on 2016 presidential vote by precinct


## Congress: Fairness Benchmarks-Partisan Representation



## Congress: Simulated Maps Expected Results



## Congress: Enacted Map Results



500,000 Simulated maps; range of estimated Democratic voters in each district
outliers

outliers

Each dot is one district's percentage of Democratic voters estimated by averaging three elections
(2016-2020)

## State Senate: 18 Extreme Districts



500,000 Simulated maps; range of estimated Democratic voters in each district
outliers

| $50 \%$ of |
| :---: |
| maps | -median

outliers
Each dot is one
district's
percentage of
Democratic voters

Source: PGP simulation using 2010 census and 2016-18-20 SoS election data

## State Senate: Partisan Imbalance



Source: PGP simulation using 2010 census and

## State Senate: Fewer Competitive Seats



## FDGA/PGP - Phase 1 findings

Politicians of both parties have used gerrymandering to maintain partisan control, despite voter preferences

Georgia House


Georgia Senate


## FDGA/PGP - Phase 1 findings

Senate map does not prioritize opportunity for Black voters


